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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United States Supreme
Court have reached a fundamental disagreement without a resolution.
Recently, the ICJ has heard a series of cases that relate to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),1 and how it is implemented by
the United States and specifically by American courts. 2 The Supreme Court,
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2009. The author would like to thank Professor Oona
Hathaway and his classmates Sumon Dantiki, Jessica Karbowski, Martha Lovejoy, and Abbas Ravjani
for their advice and support during the process of researching, writing, and revising this Note, and David
Chao and Alexandra Orme of the Yale Journal of International Law for their thoughtful editing. Any
mistakes or omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.
I. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter VCCR]. The ICJ had jurisdiction over disputes between the United States and other
signatories to the VCCR through the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325,
596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
2. Concerning the United States's implementation of the VCCR, the ICJ has reached a final
judgment in two cases. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31);
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 1.C.J. 466 (June 27). Paraguay initiated an earlier case against the
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meanwhile, has heard a series of cases that relate both to the issue of
American implementation of the VCCR and the authority that ICJ rulings
have in American domestic courts.3 The central issue in this struggle-one
that has ignited fierce debate in American legal circles-is not what rights and
duties are actually owed under the VCCR, but a broader question of how
American courts should respond to the decisions of the ICJ. Are ICJ decisions
merely persuasive authority (i.e., equivalent to a law review article that courts
should follow if its logic is persuasive, but reject if it is unconvincing) or are
they binding on American courts the way the ruling of a higher domestic court
would be (i.e., where the ICJ has spoken authoritatively on a specific issue in
a specific case, the domestic courts could not consider the logic or
persuasiveness of the opinion but merely implement it as faithfully as
possible)? This question was recently answered for American purposes in the
2008 Supreme Court case Medellin v. Texas.
5
In Medellin, the Supreme Court ruled that the ICJ's Avena judgment
regarding the use of state procedural default rules to block defendants' claims
of prejudice based on VCCR violations did not "constitute[] directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas petitions." 6 The Court stated that its "conclusion that Avena
does not by itself constitute binding federal law is confirmed by the
'postratification understanding' of signatory nations" that are party to the U.N.
Charter, the ICJ Statute, and the Optional Protocol to the VCCR.7 The Court
found it relevant that
neither Medellin nor his amici have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as
binding in domestic courts.... [T]he lack of any basis for supposing that any other
country would treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of their domestic
law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so viewed in our courts.
8
United States regarding the VCCR, but the case was dismissed after the execution of Angel Francisco
Breard. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10) (ordering
case removed from docket).
3. The Supreme Court has issued opinions that relate to ICJ decisions and the VCCR in three
cases. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006);
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam), denying cert. to Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th
Cir. 1998).
4. Indeed, on the precise issue of what rights and duties are owed under the VCCR, the lCJ
rulings may be moot, since the United States has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol of the VCCR
that grants jurisdiction to the ICJ. See Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State, to Kofi Annan,
Sec'y-Gen. of the U.N. (Mar. 7, 2005) (on file with author); see also Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 338
(noting American withdrawal from the Optional Protocol).
5. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
6. Id. at 1353. The opinion also addressed a separate but related issue: whether the
President's memorandum to the Attorney General, directing state courts to give effect to the Avena
judgment, was binding federal law. The Court answered that question in the negative as well. Id. at
1363.
7. Id. at 1363. Justice Scalia, who joined the majority in Medellin, has written on the need to
look to the interpretations of the courts of other signatories of a treaty on an issue governed by that
treaty: "We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions.
Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting parties."
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363 (footnote omitted).
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Yet is this observation helpful? If the litigants in Medellin cannot cite to case
law from another nation that incorporates ICJ judgments into domestic law,
does that indicate that other nations have rejected the idea that ICJ judgments
could be directly enforceable in domestic courts, or has the question just not
presented itself?
The Court's statement that there is no evidence that the courts of other
nations would treat ICJ decisions as binding seems at least possibly
overbroad. Both Belgian and German courts have issued rulings or opinions
that provide some suggestion that ICJ decisions are directly enforceable.
9
Although these decisions can be criticized or interpreted in other ways, they
raise enough of a question that a more comprehensive account of the question
of domestic enforceability of ICJ judgments is needed.
This Note argues that the case law of courts in other nations does not
support the Court's claim that the Medellin opinion follows the
postratification understanding of other nations. The Court refers to a shared
understanding; such an understanding would be best evidenced by the courts
of other nations considering and rejecting the idea of direct enforcement of
ICJ judgments. This Note shows that the courts of other nations that have been
party to ICJ decisions have not considered or reached a conclusion about
whether ICJ decisions would be enforceable domestically, at least among a
certain subset of nations who have been party to ICJ decisions. The silence on
the part of the courts of foreign nations negates any attempt to draw an
inference of a particular understanding about the meaning of the U.N. Charter
and the ICJ Statute.
While the Court could have been more careful by referring to a
postratification practice instead of an understanding, even that wording would
be misleading. Looking to a postratification practice, at least to the extent that
such practice would be useful for courts seeking to answer the question of
domestic enforceability of ICJ judgments, would require some form of
deliberate decisionmaking on the part of the nation whose practice is under
examination. The effect of the research presented in this Note suggests that
such deliberation has seldom occurred. If a nation's courts have never even
considered the question, how can that lack of thought be helpful in
determining the intent of the U.N. Charter signatories? This Note argues that
Medellin did not draw on a postratification practice or understanding, nor did
it conflict with the postratification understanding adopted by other nations.
The evidence from other nations is thus largely neutral to the outcome of
Medellin. However, it is not neutral with regards to the logic of the Medellin
opinion on this issue. If the Court's judgment in Medellin was a correct one, it
is so only because of the domestic legal arguments, not because of an
interpretation of what fellow signatories to the U.N. Charter have done.
Although I argue it is only rarely that domestic courts even face the
decision of enforcing or rejecting an ICJ judgment, it seems probable that the
issue will eventually arise in other nations. When the courts of those nations
do seek to resolve the issue, they will need to consider Medellin. The Court's
9. See infra note 124.
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statement regarding a shared understanding implies that the Court's decision
is extensively supported by the courts of other nations. The research of this
Note belies that implication. While a foreign court considering whether to
enforce an ICJ judgment should consider Medellin as one indication of what
the U.N. Charter requires, it need not think that Medellin provides a summary
of the understanding of the court of any nation other than the United States.
Furthermore, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent to the Medellin
judgment, numerous treaties to which the United States is a party include
provisions that give the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising from those
treaties.l0 It is possible that the issue of direct enforcement of an ICJ judgment
could arise as a result of one of those treaties; if that is the case, then future
litigants in American courts might find it useful to investigate whether the
Court in Medellin was accurate in describing a "postratification
understanding" that ICJ judgments were not enforceable directly in domestic
law.
This Note will attempt to begin a comprehensive account of foreign
court application of ICJ judgments, focusing on common law nations that
have been parties to final judgments of the ICJ. Part II will provide
background on the ICJ and discuss the series of cases in both the ICJ and
American courts about the VCCR, which culminated in the Supreme Court
decision in Medellin. Part III will provide a brief sketch of how similar
questions arose in the early period of the ICJ's history, both in academic
literature and, in a few canonical cases, in some courts around the world.
Section IV.A justifies the methodology this Note pursues and particularly
explains the method of selecting cases to investigate. Section IV.B describes
the extent to which common law nations that are the subject of this Note's
study have considered whether to directly enforce ICJ judgments. Part V
analyzes the results, and argues that the evidence suggests the issue of direct
enforcement of ICJ judgments does not often present itself to domestic courts.
However, no other common law nation has created case law that rejects direct
enforcement of ICJ judgments either. Part VI concludes by arguing that the
evidence from other nations does not directly support or contradict the Court's
argument in Medellin-there is no noticeable postratification understanding-
which suggests the opinion should be justified purely on its domestic legal
arguments.
1I. THE ICJ AND AMERICAN VIOLATIONS OF THE VCCR
The questions that the Supreme Court wrestled with in Medellin did not
appear suddenly in that case. The issue of ICJ judgments in domestic law has
been a complicated issue in American law for ten years. To fully understand
the Supreme Court's opinion in Medellin, one must appreciate the ICJ and the
series of cases both at the ICJ and in American courts that have addressed
American breaches of the VCCR. This Part first explains the origin and
10. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1393-96 app. B (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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function of the ICJ and then describes the VCCR cases, which represent a
flashpoint between American courts and the ICJ.
A. The ICJ
The ICJ is the "judicial organ of the United Nations." 1 It consists of
fifteen judges,12 selected for terms of nine years1 3 by the General Assembly.
1 4
The ICJ hears two types of cases: contentious and advisory. Advisory cases
originate from the requests of various U.N. bodies and have little to do with
the topic of this Note, because nations are not parties to those rulings and are
not obligated under the U.N. Charter to obey them. 15 Contentious cases, then,
are the main focus of this Note. Only states can be parties to contentious ICJ
cases. 16 Contentious cases can reach the ICJ in three ways: two states that face
a specific dispute can reach a special agreement to refer that dispute to the
court for resolution; a state that has a disagreement with another state over
the obligations of a treaty to which both are parties can bring a case to the ICJ
if that treaty includes a "compromissory" clause whereby the signatories of
the treaty agree in advance to the court's jurisdiction over issues that arise
under the treaty;1 8 and a state may consent generally to resolve any dispute
before the ICJ that is referred by another nation that has made a similar
agreement.' 9 Because the parties to the contentious cases are sovereigns, the
court is usually quite careful in deciding whether it has jurisdiction over a
case, and it dismisses many of its cases because of objections to jurisdiction
from the responding state.
ICJ judgments are binding only on the specific parties and only in the
specific case before the court.20 Consequently, the U.N. Charter does not
create any legal requirement that other nations, not party to a specific dispute,
give precedential weight to the opinion that resolves a dispute. For the nations
who are party to an ICJ judgment, it is considered binding, and the duty to
comply with the judgment is codified in the U.N. Charter: "[e]ach Member of
11. U.N. Charter art. 92, para. 1.
12. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3, para. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
13. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
14. Id. art. 4, para. I.
15. The Security Council, the General Assembly, and other U.N. organs that are authorized by
the General Assembly may request that the ICJ issue an advisory ruling on a given legal issue. U.N.
Charter art. 96, paras. 1-2. The party that requested the ruling is not bound by the results of that ruling.
Some of the more infamous ICJ cases have been advisory rulings. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9)
(advising on the legality of Israel's construction of a wall in the West Bank, at the request of the General
Assembly); Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8) (advising on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons at the request of the
World Health Organization).
16. ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 34, para 1.
17. Id. art. 36, para. 1.
18. Id. Compromissory clauses can either be part of a treaty itself or included in an optional
protocol to the treaty, which allows nations to sign the treaty itself and decide separately if they should
be bound to the ICJ's jurisdiction on that issue.
19. Id. art. 36, para 2.
20. Id. art. 59.
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the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." 21 If a victorious party is
unsatisfied with the efforts the losing party makes in complying with the
judgment, it may seek Security Council intervention to enforce it:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken
to give effect to the judgment.22
The Security Council has never intervened to enforce an ICJ judgment under
Article 94(2).23
B. The VCCR Series of Cases
The current uncertainty regarding the role of ICJ decisions in American
domestic courts has been ignited by a series of cases involving the
interpretation of the VCCR. The VCCR is a codification of preexisting
customary practices on the role of consuls stationed in foreign countries. 2' The
specific dispute has arisen over American states' difficulty informing alien
arrestees of their right to notify the consul of their nation of citizenship 26 and
the ability of that consul to assist in the defense of the individual once he has
been charged.27 The United States ratified the VCCR in 1963 along with an
21. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
22. Id. art. 94, para. 2.
23. CONSTANCE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 39 (2004).
24. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit faced the issue of whether an
ICJ judgment was domestically enforceable in a case that sought to enjoin the American government
from aiding the Nicaraguan Contras. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929
(D.C. Cir. 1988). The plaintiffs based their claim in part on an ICJ judgment, Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), which held that the United
States had violated international law in its support of the Contra movement. Id. at 146. The court
rejected this claim based in part on the idea that ICJ judgments were to be enforced through political
channels, because the U.N. Charter and the ICJ Statute did not confer standing on individual actors.
Comm. of U.S. Citizens, 859 F.2d at 937-38. The court cited ongoing attempts by Nicaragua to enforce
the judgment through the Security Council as an example of political efforts to enforce ICJ decisions. Id.
at 932.
25. VCCR, supra note 1, pmbl.
26. The text of the relevant provision of the VCCR is:
[l]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph ....
Id. art. 36(l)(b).
27. The relevant provision of the VCCR is:
[C]onsular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his
legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national
who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
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Optional Protocol to the Convention, which granted jurisdiction of
disagreements over the Convention's terms to the ICJ.
These treaties, along with the U.N. Charter and its annexed ICJ Statute,
were all ratified in accordance with American constitutional law-signed by
the President and consented to by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.2 A duly
ratified treaty constitutes a binding international obligation on the nations that
have ratified it as long as that treaty is in force. It is thus a relatively
uncontroversial statement to say that the United States is obligated to follow
the U.N. Charter and the VCCR as a matter of international law. 31 For some
nations, admitting such a statement might have been powerful evidence for a
resolution of Medellin in favor of the petitioner. So-called "monist" nations
hold to a tradition that an international obligation usually creates a
corresponding domestic legal obligation. 32 "Dualist" nations, on the other
hand, require domestic legislative enactments to translate international legal
obligations into enforceable domestic obligations. 33 The American
Constitution describes treaties as the "supreme law of the land," along with
itself and federal statutes.34 However, such language does not mean that the
United States is a monist nation. American courts have held that treaties can
either be self-executing, thus forming domestic law, or non-self-executing,
thus creating only international obligations.35 The determination of whether a
treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing depends on whether "the treaty
itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on those
terms.,, 36 As a result of this jurisprudence, admitting that the U.N. Charter
binds the United States internationally, and thus that ICJ judgments to which
the United States is a party are also binding,37 does not resolve the status of
these documents in American domestic law.
In 1998, Paraguay, which like the United States is a signatory to the
VCCR and the Optional Protocol, brought a claim against the United States in
the ICJ over the conviction of Paraguayan national Angel Francesco Breard.
Breard was convicted of capital murder and rape in Virginia without being
informed of his right to require authorities to notify his consul of his arrest,
38
and thus without the assistance of the consul. Paraguay sought provisional
protection by the ICJ because Breard was scheduled to be executed shortly
Id. art. 36(1)(c).
28. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. I.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
30. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (4th ed. 2003).
31. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008). By acknowledging that Avena is binding
on the United States as a matter of international law, the Court implicitly acknowledged that the U.N.
Charter and the VCCR, necessary predicates for the Avena ruling, were also binding on the United
States.
32. France may be the most prominent example of a monist nation. See JANIS, supra note 30,
at 100.
33. The United Kingdom has traditionally been a strongly dualist nation. See id. at 98-99.
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356.
36. Id. (quoting Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc)).
37. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
38. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 249 (Apr. 9).
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after the case was filed; in response, the ICJ ordered that the United States
"take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings." 39 At the same time,
Breard attempted to raise the VCCR issue in a federal habeas petition, and
Paraguay filed suit in district court raising parallel issues; when the lower
courts ruled against both cases, the litigants sought a writ of certiorari and stay
of execution, in part claiming the Supreme Court should enforce the
provisional measures and allow the ICJ to complete its proceedings. 40
However, the Supreme Court rejected the petitions for certiorari and the
requests for stay of execution. It held that Breard had procedurally defaulted
on his Vienna Convention claim by not raising the issue during his original
proceeding; that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provided
an independent ground to bar the claim because of its requirement that habeas
petitioners develop a claim in state court proceedings; that the Eleventh
Amendment barred Paraguay from suing Virginia to halt the execution; and
that Paraguay could not pursue a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.4 1 After Virginia
executed Breard, Paraguay requested that the ICJ remove the case from its
docket.42
In 1999, the issue of American obligations under the VCCR reached the
ICJ again in the case Germany instituted against the United States over the
LaGrand brothers. The LaGrands were German citizens convicted of murder
and attempted robbery in Arizona. They were not informed of the option of
notifying the German consul; the consul thus was not able to assist in the
defense; the two were sentenced to death. After the execution of Karl
LaGrand, Germany instituted proceedings against the United States in the ICJ
and sought an order for provisional measures protecting Walter LaGrand
against execution.43 This order was granted, but LaGrand was executed the
same day.44 Nonetheless, Germany continued with the case. The ICJ reached
the merits of the case and held that the VCCR did create individual rights;45 it
also ruled that the United States had violated the rights of Germany and the
LaGrands by not informing the LaGrands of their rights to consular
notification.46 The court held that procedural default rules should not have
been used to bar review of the LaGrands' claims of violations of VCCR
rights. 47 The ICJ also found that if a German citizen were in the future
sentenced to severe penalties after a violation of her right to consular
notification under the VCCR, the United States should permit review and
reconsideration of the sentence in a manner of its choosing. 8
39. Id. at 258.
40. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998).
41. Id. at 376-78.
42. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, 427 (Nov. 10).
43. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3).
44. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 1.C.J. 466, 479-80 (June 27).
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id. at 492.
47. Id. at 497-98.
48. Id. at 513-14.
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American obligations under the VCCR reached the ICJ a third time in
the Avena and other Mexican Nationals case.4 9 The ICJ reached the merits of
Mexico's claims regarding fifty-two Mexican nationals; 50 it repeated its
LaGrand holding that the VCCR did create individual rights and held that the
United States had violated the VCCR rights of both Mexico and its
nationals. 51 The ICJ mandated that the United States provide review and
reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals
involved in light of the violation of the VCCR rights and the reasoning of the
court's opinion. 52 The court repeated the conclusion it reached in LaGrand
that procedural default rules could not bar the required review; 53 it noted that
the review and reconsideration procedure should be carried out by American
courts, not executive clemency proceedings. 54 The court also held that a
similar duty existed for any future violation of the VCCR rights by the United
States.55 The court explained that the fact that its determinations in the Avena
judgment addressed Mexican nationals did not mean that it would not reach a
similar judgment in the future regarding other nations that brought VCCR
claims.
Jose Emesto Medellin, one of the Mexican nationals on whose behalf
Mexico sought the ICJ judgment in Avena, 57 cited the violation of his VCCR
rights as one ground for relief in his federal habeas petition from a conviction
for two rape-homicides in Texas.58 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied the claim and dismissed Medellin's citations to both LaGrand and
Avena, ruling that the Supreme Court's prior ruling in Breard that procedural
default rules apply to claims of VCCR violations controlled the case. 59 It also
noted that even if the procedural bar did not apply, the Fifth Circuit had
previously ruled that the VCCR did not create individual rights, which
conflicted with the holdings in LaGrand and Avena that the VCCR did create
such rights. 60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case, but then
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 61 Between the grant of certiorari
and oral argument at the Supreme Court, President Bush issued a
memorandum which stated that the United States would fulfill its duties under
Avena by "having State courts give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance
49. (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
50. Id. at 42.
51. Id. at 53-54. The court did rule that one Mexican national's rights were not violated. Id. at
46.
52. Id. at 60, 65-66.
53. Id. at 63.
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id. at 73.
56. Id. at 69-70. One could ask whether this is an attempt by the ICJ to evade the U.N.
Charter's limitations on the effect of ICJ judgments, but that question is beyond the scope of this Note.
57. Id. at 25.
58. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004).
The facts of Medellin and his associates' assault and murder of the two adolescent girls, as recounted by
Medellin in a detailed confession, were horrific. See Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Medellin v. Texas, 128
S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
59. See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d at 280.
60. Id.
61. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2004) (per curiam), dismissing cert. to 371 F.3d 270
(5th Cir. 2004).
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with general principles of comity." 62 Medellin then commenced a new state
habeas corpus proceeding seeking to enforce the President's memorandum. 63
The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the writ as improvidently granted
based on the new state filing.
64
While the Medellin case went through the state habeas proceeding, two
foreign nationals-Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national not
referenced in the Avena judgment, and Mario A. Bustillo, a Honduran
national-brought the issue of the VCCR back to the Supreme Court through
appeals from state court proceedings. 65 In the case of Sanchez-Llamas, the
Court concluded that suppression of statements taken after a violation of a
suspect's VCCR rights was an inappropriate remedy. 67 In the case of
Bustillo, who argued that Breard's earlier holding that procedural default
rules apply to VCCR claims should be set aside in light of Avena, the Court
was faced with the question of whether to alter its own precedent because of
its inconsistency with the LaGrand and Avena opinions. The Court rejected
that argument, noting that ICJ judgments are binding only between the parties
and in that particular case,6 9 and that the United States no longer recognizes
the jurisdiction of the ICJ in VCCR matters.70 The Court determined that ICJ
opinions are entitled only to "respectful consideration," 71 and concluded that
Breard's ruling that procedural default rules govern VCCR claims should
stand.72
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Medellin's habeas
petition (filed after President Bush's memorandum) because neither the Avena
decision nor the President's memorandum were binding law that required the
court to set aside the state's procedural default rules and to review Medellin's
claims of prejudice.73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.74 While Texas
argued that the question of whether the state courts must give effect to the
Avena judgment was answered in Sanchez-Llamas,75 the petitioner argued that
Sanchez-Llamas dealt with whether Avena is general precedent, whereas in
the instant case it should be used as binding authority, because in the instant
case the ICJ statute requirement of "same parties, same case" for binding
62. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the U.S., to the Att'y Gen. (Feb. 28,
2005), available at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/2005-03- 10_Avenacompliance.pdf.
63. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. at 662.
64. Id.
65. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 339-42 (2006).
66. Id. at 343. The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the VCCR did create
individual rights. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the VCCR creates individual rights for
an alien defendant in a criminal case.
67. Id. at 350-51.
68. Id. at 352-53.
69. Id. at 354-55 (citing ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 59).
70. Id. at 355.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 360.
73. Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. granted, Medellin v.
Texas, 127 S. Ct. 2129 (2007).
74. Id.
75. Brief for Respondent, supra note 58, at II.
2009] Medellin Stands Alone
force is satisfied.76 The Supreme Court, as discussed above, ruled in favor of
Texas and held that the ICJ opinion did not create federal law that trumped the
state procedural default rules.
77
The Supreme Court rested its decision in Medellin on the grounds that
none of the relevant treaties-the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and the
ICJ Statute-were self-executing. 78 The Court interpreted the language of the
U.N. Charter to mean that a government party to ICJ disputes was obligated to
enforce the provisions, but that it "is not a directive to domestic courts." 79 The
Court argued that Article 94(2) of the Charter, which permits a victorious
party to seek the Security Council's assistance in enforcing a judgment, was
"evidence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic
courts" because it was a diplomatic, rather than a judicial, remedy.80 The
Court believed that, at the time of ratification of the Charter, the President and
the Senate wished to preserve "the option of noncompliance," which would
exist if Article 94(2) were the sole remedy. 8' The Court further drew on the
structure of the ICJ Statute, which states that ICJ judgments are binding
between the parties and that only nations may be parties.
When determining the meaning of a treaty, in addition to considering
textual arguments, "[b]ecause a treaty ratified by the United States is 'an
agreement among sovereign powers,' [the Court has] also considered as 'aids
to its interpretation' the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well
as 'the postratification understanding' of signatory nations., 83 In Medellin, the
Court argued that the postratification understanding of other nations
76. Brief for Petitioner at 21-22, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
Bustillo, the petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas who urged the Court to follow Avena, was a Honduran
national; Medellin was a Mexican national who was specifically listed in the Avena decision.
77. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1367. This March 25 Supreme Court opinion did not
conclude the saga of litigation surrounding Medellin. Mexico sought further ICJ intervention in the form
of a request for an interpretation of the Avena judgment; the ICJ responded by issuing provisional
measures, including an order that the United States take necessary measures to ensure that Medellin was
not executed before the court came to a full decision on Mexico's request. Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2008 I.C.J. 3, 19 (Order of June 16). After the ICJ issued the provisional measures, Medellin filed
additional habeas petitions before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, and the U.S. Supreme Court. However, each of these courts rejected his
request to grant a stay of execution. Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360, 361-62 (2008); Medellin v.
Quarterman, No. H-06-3688, 2008 WL 2937750, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2008); Ex parte Medellin,
No. WR-50191-03, 2008 WL 2952485, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. July 31, 2008). On August 6, 2008,
Medellin was executed. Michael Graczyk, Mexican-Born Killer Executed: Divided High Court Rejected
Reprieve, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2008, at 4. The ICJ ultimately rejected Mexico's request for an
interpretation of its previous judgment in the Avena case, noting that the Avena opinion did not include a
ruling as to whether it would be directly domestically enforceable or not. Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 (Mex. v. U.S.), paras. 44-46 (Order of Jan. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14939.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). The court did hold that
the United States failed to uphold its obligations to stay the execution of Medellin as the court had
ordered in its July 2008 provisional measures ruling. Id. paras. 52-53.
78. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
79. Id. at 1358.
80. Id. at 1359.
81. Id. at 1360.
82. Id. at 1361.
83. Id. at 1357.
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"confirmed" the conclusion reached by the textual arguments. 84 The Court
noted that "neither Medellin nor his amici have identified a single nation that
treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts," a fact which the Court
concluded "strongly suggests" that the judgments should not be treated as
binding by American courts.
85
The holdings of LaGrand and Avena, that procedural default rules could
not apply to VCCR claims, directly contradict the position reached in Breard.
Sanchez-Llamas was an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to reposition
its case law to comply with Avena as a matter of general precedent. However,
it declined to do so. Medellin offered the Court the opportunity to decide
whether Avena should be respected by American courts as a binding
judgment. Based on the Court's ruling in Medellin, Avena appears to be
unimportant for American courts wrestling with VCCR questions. But was
this a foregone conclusion? Had other courts already considered the issue of
domestic application of an ICJ decision?
III. EARLY DEBATES ON DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT OF ICJ DECISIONS
Although Medellin and the cases associated with it brought the issue of
domestic enforcement of ICJ decisions to the forefront in the United States,
this is not a new issue. Scholars debated whether domestic courts were bound
by ICJ decisions shortly after the creation of the court. Domestic courts,
meanwhile, in some cases considered the domestic enforcement question
directly when litigants called upon those courts to recognize the case law of
the ICJ or its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
Although the scholarly writings and the domestic court case law from this
period are educational, they do not point to a single conclusion on whether ICJ
opinions should be domestically enforceable. Instead, both the idea of
domestic enforceability and refutations of it are found in the early
examinations of the subject.
A. Early Scholarship on Domestic Court-ICJ Interaction
International law scholars considered the issue of how domestic courts
should respond to ICJ judgments during the court's early period. Shabtai
Rosenne, for instance, claimed that "[t]he duty to carry out, or comply with,
such a judgment is imposed upon the courts of a State party to litigation
before the International Court no less than it is incumbent upon the other
organs of that state," 86 such as that state's executive. Oscar Schachter also
discussed the possibility of using domestic court proceedings to enforce ICJ
judgments.8 7 Schachter assumed that a creditor nation could seize the property
of a debtor state in its borders by executive action, so that a creditor nation
84. Id. at 1363.
85. Id.
86. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 88 (1957).
87. Oscar Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-14 (1960).
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would not need to resort to its own courts. Instead, Schachter envisioned the
possibility of a nation seeking enforcement of a judgment against the assets of
a nation held in a third nation, using that third nation's courts. 88 He argued
that such a suit should be immune from sovereign immunity protection and
pointed to the Article 94(1) obligation of U.N. members to undertake to
enforce ICJ judgments as justification for that argument. 89
However, Schachter did not address other situations where ICJ
judgments might be relevant to domestic court proceedings. The first is the
possibility of a creditor nation seeking relief in the courts of a debtor nation if
the political branches refused to provide compensation. Another situation
would be a suit by a private party affected by an ICJ judgment. Such
situations sometimes arise when the claims of the private party actually led to
the ICJ suit. Such questions raise issues similar to those raised by the use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel in American courts.
90
Ian Brownlie argued that ICJ judgments should not be binding on
domestic courts when he stated:
In principle decisions by organs of international organizations are not binding on national
courts without the co-operation of the internal legal system .... It follows that a decision
of the International Court, though it concerns substantially the same issues as those
before a municipal court, does not of itself create a resjudicata for the latter.
91
However, Brownlie modified this answer by arguing that "it does not follow
that a municipal court could not ... recognize the validity of the judgment of
an international tribunal... at least for certain purposes."92 Possible examples
include domestic courts using the judgments of international military tribunals
as evidence that an occupation is illegal and using the judgments of
international courts as evidence of the territorial sovereignty of a state.
93
Brownlie's modified answer still did not give ICJ judgments the strength that
Rosenne and Schachter argued they should have. It appears that early scholars
were troubled by the question of how a domestic court might interact with an
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Collateral estoppel may not be granted where the prior judgment is inconclusive as to
what issues were actually decided. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 343 (5th Cir.
1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. g (1982)). Thus, a preliminary question
in applying an ICJ judgment to an individual litigant's case might be whether the judgment actually
decided the relevant issue. More fundamentally, use of collateral estoppel has raised questions of due
process, such that collateral estoppel may not be used against a party that was not a party to the first
action. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) ("Some litigants-
those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the
issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process
prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand
squarely against their position."). This principle might suggest that an individual litigant could never be
estopped from litigating an issue decided unfavorably by an ICJ decision, because an individual litigant
could never, in the strict sense of the word, be a party to an ICJ judgment. However, this precise
question depends on how broadly one construes concepts of privity and virtual representation, and
whether nations virtually represent their individual citizens in international contexts.
91. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (6th ed. 2003) (citations
omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 51-52.
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ICJ judgment. Several floated ideas about how to resolve the question, but
none answered it definitively.
B. Canonical Case Law on Domestic Court Use of World Court
Opinions
The question of domestic court use of international court judgments
arose in several different nations in the 1950s. Although one famous case
involved a judgment issued by the PCIJ, 94 the remainder of these cases dealt
with some of the early decisions of the ICJ.
95
"Socobel" v. Greek State,96 Administration des Habous v. Deal,97 and
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Lal-La Fatma Bent si Mohamed El
Khadar98 are the primary examples cited by scholars when discussing the
approach that foreign courts have taken toward the interaction between the
ICJ and domestic courts.99 While other domestic court cases interacted with
ICJ proceedings during the early period of the court's creation, they are not
relevant to this Note because these cases did not deal with a final ICJ
judgment. l00 As discussed in Section IV.A below, the subject of this Note is
94. "Socobel" v. Greek State, 18 I.L.R. 3, 5 (Belg. Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles 1951).
95. The ICJ is very similar to the PCIJ, and consequently the issue of municipal court
acknowledgement of PCIJ judgments involves mostly the same questions as municipal court use of ICJ
judgments. But see U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (providing that the Security Council "decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment," but only "if it deems necessary"); League of
Nations Covenant art. 13, para. 4 (providing that the League Council "shall propose what steps should
be taken to give effect" to judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice "[i]n the event of
any failure to carry out such an award or decision"). The U.N. Security Council appears to have greater
flexibility in deciding whether to enforce an ICJ judgment than the League Council did with regard to a
PCIJ judgment. This could create some legitimate difference between the municipal effect of PCIJ
judgments and ICJ judgments; however, I have not found a case that distinguishes the two based on that
difference.
96. Socobel, 18 I.L.R. at 3.
97. 19 I.L.R. 342 (Morocco Ct. App. Rabat 1952).
98. 21 I.L.R. 136 (Tangier Ct. App. Int. Trib. 1954).
99. See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, Lori Fisler Damrosch & Martin Flaherty, Medellin v. Dretke:
Federalism and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 690 (2005) (providing comments
by Curtis Bradley at a debate held at Columbia Law School on February 21, 2005); A. Mark Weisburd,
International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 886 (2000); Philip V. Tisne, Note,
The IC and Municipal Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and LaGrand Decisions in U.S.
Courts, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 865, 903 (2006).
100. The ICJ case Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22) (Judgment on
Preliminary Objections), paralleled litigation in several municipal courts worldwide. The United
Kingdom brought the case complaining of Iran's nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Company's oil
holdings under a theory of diplomatic protection. Although the ICJ found that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case, id. at 114, its opinion was cited by courts in both Italy and Japan in support of the
conclusion that a prior agreement between Anglo-Iranian and Iran was not a treaty. Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 22 I.L.R. 23, 41 (Italy Civ. Ct. Rome 1955); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. ldemitsu
Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 I.L.R. 305, 308 (Japan High Ct. Tokyo 1953). Perhaps most interesting,
however, is the omission of any reference to the ICJ proceedings by a court in the British colony of
Aden when that court addressed the question of whether Iran's actions were violations of international
law. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, 20 I.L.R. 316, 328 (Aden Sup. Ct. 1953). While the ICJ judgment
was only on the issue of jurisdiction, courts in countries that were not parties to the case found it useful
to cite the judgment as a reason to support their conclusions, but a court in a territory of a nation that
was a party completely ignored the ICJ proceedings that at least related to the case before it.
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limited to final judgments of the ICJ. These three cases provide useful
background when considering the contemporary question of whether to
enforce the ICJ judgments on the VCCR in domestic American courts. The
cases themselves, however, provide little guidance. One case (Socobel)
famously rejected judicial enforcement of World Court opinions; the second
(Deal) accepted such enforcement; and the third (Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co.) followed the first in rejecting such enforcement, but did so in what would
be considered dicta.
10
The first prominent case that addressed the issue of how domestic courts
should deal with World Court judgments was the "Socobel" v. Greek State
case in Belgium. The Belgian plaintiff sought to execute an arbitral award
against Greece by seizing Greek property in Belgium. The plaintiff claimed
that it did not need an exequatur102 to enforce the arbitral award because the
binding nature of the award had been approved by the PCIJ and because the
PCIJ judgment dispensed with the need for an exequatur. 103 The Belgian court
disagreed:
The plaintiff Company claims that it cannot be conceived that a decision emanating from
the International Court, which decides disputes between States, should require the
exequatur of Belgian tribunals. De legeferenda such an exemption from exequatur seems
conceivable or even legitimate. However, at the present time, no international
arrangement has introduced such a principle into the Belgian legal system.l4
While the Belgian court conceded that it could be logical to design a system
where World Court judgments are directly binding, it did not see the League
of Nations Covenant or any subsequent multilateral convention as providing
such a system. A provision for direct enforcement required further legal
innovation. The court also noted that the plaintiff was seeking the benefit of a
judgment generated by a case which was officially between Belgium and
Greece. "It is inconceivable that a party which, by definition, is not admitted
to the bar of an international court should be able to rely on a judicial decision
in a case to which it was not a party." 1 5 Yet, the Belgian court did not
categorically rule that international court judgments could never be enforced
by the courts of Belgium; it required that such judgments must at least be put
through the exequatur process like the judgment of any foreign court.
The ICJ decision on Rights of Nationals of the United States of America
in Morocco0 6 triggered two opinions by courts in Morocco that addressed the
issue of the relationship between ICJ opinions and domestic courts. The ICJ
faced a claim that United States consular courts had jurisdiction over any case,
101. Socobel, 18 I.L.R. at 5; Deal, 19 I.L.R. at 344; Mackay Radio, 21 I.L.R. at 136.
102. An exequatur, or executive judgment or executory judgment, is an action by which a court
in nation A may recognize the validity of the judgment of a court of nation B so that the successful party
may directly enforce the judgment in nation A. Nations differ in how readily executive judgments are
granted. In English law, "the valid foreign judgment is conclusive as to its merits [so] the English courts
have not the right ... to re-examine the whole case and to refuse the exequatur if they hold the foreign
judgment bad." MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 250 (2d ed. 1950).
103. Socobel, 18 I.L.R. at 3-4.
104. Id. at 4.
105. Id. at 5.
106. (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27).
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civil or criminal, in which an American citizen was a defendant in the French
zone of Morocco.'0 7 The ICJ rejected this claim and ruled that U.S. consular
courts had jurisdiction only in disputes between American citizens. 08 An
appeals court in Rabat, when faced with a dispute where an American was a
defendant, based its jurisdiction of the dispute on the ICJ ruling: "since the
Hague Judgment, and subject to the reservations therein contained, American
nationals... are subject to the same courts as other foreign nationals."' 1 9 The
Moroccan court appeared to take the ICJ judgment as a conclusive description
of its jurisdiction with regard to American citizens. While the court did not
discuss the intent of the parties to the U.N. Charter, it found it unproblematic
to apply the World Court judgment to a domestic court proceeding.
However, the complicated history of colonial involvement in Morocco
meant that this decision did not apply to the entire country. While the bulk of
Morocco was under a French "protectorate" (hence France was the respondent
in the ICJ), parts of Morocco were controlled by the Spanish, and the city of
Tangier was internationally controlled. 10 The appellate court of Tangier
responded to the ICJ decision quite differently from the court in Rabat.
Responding to a finding by a trial court that the ICJ decision governed its
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicability of the decision
because, first, it does not create precedent, the Judgment itself declaring that its
applicability is limited to the French Zone of Morocco; secondly, because, even if this
were not so... its judgments [do not] have any binding force in municipal courts; and,
thirdly, because the judgments of the International Court of Justice resolve differences
arising between States .... I
The court's position was thus opposite to the opinion of the Rabat court.
While it based its disregard for the ICJ judgment first on the fact that the
International Zone of Tangier was not a party to the case, it continued its
discussion and (in dicta) categorically rejected the idea that ICJ judgments are
binding on domestic courts at all. Neither the Rabat court nor the Tangier
court provided evidence for their starkly opposing views of the effect of ICJ
judgments in domestic courts; neither considered its opinion problematic.
While the cases discussed above (Socobel, Deal, Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co.) present intriguing questions, they provide few answers to the
question of how the signatories to the U.N. Charter conceived of the
relationship between an ICJ judgment and the domestic courts of a nation
party to that judgment. The court in Rabat, Morocco, applied the ICJ
judgment from Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco, but did not discuss the
reasons why it was appropriate to do so. The most extensive court discussions
appear in Socobel and Mackay Radio, both of which came down against the
direct enforcement of ICJ judgments by domestic courts. However, the
107. Id. at 190.
108. Id. at 201.
109. Admin. des Habous v. Deal, 19 I.L.R. 342 (Morocco Ct. App. Rabat 1952).
110. See C.R. PENNELL, MOROCCO SINCE 1830, at 158, 166-67 (2000).
Ill. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Lal-La Fatma Bent si Mohamed El Khadar, 21 I.L.R. 136
(Tangier Ct. App. Int. Trib. 1954).
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Tangier court in Mackay Radio first found that the ICJ judgment by its own
terms did not apply to Tangier," so the subsequent discussion that suggests
that ICJ judgments could never be binding on domestic courts is technically
dicta. The Belgian court in Socobel focused primarily on the lack of an
exequatur in explaining why the PCIJ judgment was not binding. Although
language that appears later in the opinion focuses on the issue of whether a
private party can claim the benefit of a judgment the parties to which were
states,' 13this language is also dicta and the court never explicitly stated that it
would be impossible to obtain an exequatur for a World Court judgment and
thus render it enforceable in domestic courts. These cases, though frequently
cited in the academic literature, 114 do not provide any clear evidence of how
the relationship between ICJ judgments and domestic courts was viewed at the
beginning period of the ICJ.
IV. THE PRACTICE OF COURTS ABROAD: DOES IT CONFORM TO MEDELLIM.
While the issue of domestic enforcement of ICJ decisions arose in the
court's early period, these cases might not be helpful in comparing American
practice to the postratification practice of other members of the U.N. Charter.
I discuss why, and propose a different set of nations to examine-specifically,
common law nations that have been party to ICJ judgments-in Section IV.A.
In Section IV.B, I describe the ICJ cases each such nation has been party to,
and whether these cases could be helpful to American understanding of
national obligations to the ICJ.
A. Methodology
A striking feature of Socobel, Deal, and Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.
is that none of these cases occurred in a common law nation. The relevance of
postratification understanding is not formally limited to the nations of the
same legal tradition--especially with regards to the U.N. Charter.
Technically, any party to the treaty can shed light on the shared understanding
of the signatories at the time of drafting. Nor did the Court in Medellin discuss
the difference between common and civil law nations. However, the Court in
Medellin also did not attempt to search for evidence of foreign court practice
at all. " 15 It relied on the parties to brief the Court on the issue. 1 6 It is not
possible to know whether the Court would have been equally persuaded by
evidence of domestic enforcement from a civil law or a common law nation.
However, for reasons that I explain below, if a court of a common law nation
has addressed the issue of enforcement, then I believe American courts may
find such evidence particularly persuasive.
The United States, as a common law nation, shares more of its legal
heritage and structure with other common law nations than it does with civil
112. Id. at 137.
113. "Socobel" v. Greek State, 18 I.L.R. 3, 5 (Beig. Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles 1951).
114. See Weisburd, supra note 99, at 883.
115. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
116. Id. at 1363.
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law nations. The common law tradition views judges as "culture heroes, even
parental figures." 117 Although infrequently discussed in contemporary
American legal scholarship, the common law "was originally created and has
grown and developed in the hands of judges .... We are accustomed, in the
common law world, to judicial review of administrative action . . . ,,118 In
contrast, the civil law tradition has a strict view of separation of powers that
cabins the judicial role.' 19 In that tradition, stare decisis is rejected, at least
formally, and "[t]he net image is of judges as operators of a machine designed
and built by legislators."' 120 The contrasting views the two traditions hold of
judges could cut either way. On the one hand, a tradition that formally
embraces stare decisis and is accustomed to superior courts instructing inferior
courts (the common law tradition) might be more willing to accept the ICJ as
yet another superior court to be followed. On the other hand, the civil law
tradition conceptualizes a judge as a mechanic, rather than as a powerful
lawmaker, and so it might be less threatening psychologically for a civil law
nation to acknowledge the opinion of the ICJ than a common law nation,
which so emphasizes the role of the judge; in a system that emphasizes the
power and importance of a judge, giving weight to the judgment of a foreign
court is to acknowledge the power and importance of that foreign court. Of
even more practical importance, most common law nations, following the
tradition of the United Kingdom, reject the idea of self-executing international
legal obligations and embrace a firmly dualist view. 121 On the other hand,
some civil law nations tend toward a monist view of international law, such
that a binding international legal obligation can become a binding source of
municipal law without additional legislative assistance.122 To put it another
way, a common law nation such as the United Kingdom would be the least
obvious case to find direct enforcement, and the most likely to reject that idea.
If nations that, by virtue of their legal tradition, are the most likely to reject
direct enforcement of ICJ judgments, do not actually demonstrate a
postratification understanding which supports Medellin's claim, then a
postratification understanding which does support Medellin is unlikely to exist
in the practice of other nations either.
Such common heritage and structure suggests that the views of
judiciaries in other common law countries would be more influential than the
judiciaries of nations following a different legal tradition. The question
presented focuses on the role of courts (which as discussed above, is a special
and troubling role in the common law tradition), and on the interaction of
municipal and international law (about which the common law has a dualist
view). Thus, the practice of other common law nations might be especially
helpful in answering American concems, or, at the very least, is a good
117. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 34 (3d ed. 2007).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 36.
120. Id.
121. JANIS, supra note 30, at 85.
122. Janis cites France as an example. Id. at 100.
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starting point for such answers. For these reasons, I have chosen to focus my
study on common law nations.
23
The nature of the ICJ Statute and the U.N. Charter determines the set of
nations within this Note's research. By the terms of the ICJ Statute, the court's
judgments are binding only upon the nations that are party to the particular
judgment, and only in regards to that specific case. 24 Thus, while a court in a
nonparty country might use an ICJ judgment as precedent, it is not legally
obligated to follow the judgment in the way that-at least according to some
legal scholars-the national courts of parties to the judgment are bound. In
determining whether other nations treat ICJ judgments as binding on domestic
courts, one should examine only those countries that have been parties to an
ICJ case as opposed to all common law nations. Finally, the legal weight of
ICJ orders indicating provisional protection was for a long time unclear. It
was not until the LaGrand case that the ICJ ruled that nations were as legally
bound to follow provisional orders as they are to follow final judgments. 11
Because of this legal uncertainty, it would be unfair to attempt to evaluate
whether nations treated provisional orders as directly enforceable in domestic
courts. To my knowledge, the only common law nation since LaGrand that
has been the subject of provisional orders is the United States.' 26 As a result,
123. Unfortunately, time and resource constraints did not permit this Note to address every
judgment the ICJ has issued. While alternative methods of selecting cases exist-only the oldest cases,
only the most recent cases, a purely random selection of final judgments, only cases involving nations
that are repeat players-I believe the common/civil division is an efficient one precisely because
common law nations are the most likely to reject direct enforcement of ICJ judgments in a way that
supports Medellin.
124. See ICJ Statute, supra note 12, art. 59. Two foreign judicial opinions that arguably cut
against the Medellin opinion, from the Belgian Court of Cassation and the German Federal
Constitutional Court, involve application of ICJ opinions in instances that violate the "same parties,
same case" requirement of the ICJ Statute. In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, the ICJ ruled that
Belgium was required to cancel an arrest warrant issued against the then-sitting foreign minister of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14). Belgium did
cancel the arrest warrant. SCHULTE, supra note 23, at 269. However the court that cancelled the arrest
warrant did not produce a written opinion to explain its rationale. In a case that related to the same
Belgian statute that sparked the Arrest Warrant case, the Belgian Court of Cassation applied at least part
of the ICJ decision's definition of official immunity. However, the court also reached a contrary opinion
from another part of the ICJ decision. Antonio Cassese, The Belgian Court of Cassation v. The
International Court of Justice: The Sharon and Others Case, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 437, 437 (2003).
More recently, in discussing the VCCR and Avena, the German Federal Constitutional Court "held that
the failure of the criminal courts to consider and evaluate the legal consequences of a violation of Article
36(1)(b) infringed the defendants' right to a fair trial." Klaus Ferdinand Garditz, Article 36, Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations-Treaty Interpretation and Enforcement-International Court of
Justice-Fair Trial-Suppression of Evidence, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 627, 628 (2007). Even though
Germany was not a party to the Avena suit, because Germany is a party to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and its Optional Protocol for ICJ interpretation, German courts are henceforth
obligated to consider ICJ judgments on the issue. Id. at 629. The German Constitutional Court required
lower courts to use ICJ decisions as precedent and to treat them as providing a "guiding function" on
treaties that the ICJ had interpreted, regardless of whether Germany is a party to the particular ICJ case.
Id. A commentator claims that the result "entrusts the ICJ with functions that are beyond its legal
competence as a mere dispute settlement organ." Id. at 633.
125. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 506 (June 27).
126. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 77 (Order of Feb. 5)
(granting request for provisional measures); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March
2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Order of July 16,
2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2009)
(granting request for provisional measures); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March
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the scope of an attempt to determine whether other nations give ICJ judgments
binding legal effect in domestic courts is restricted only to nations that have
been party to those cases that have generated final judgments by the ICJ in
this Note.
Combining these required factors (common law nations which have been
parties to ICJ final judgments) yields a targeted set of countries to investigate.
The nite Kin127The United Kingdom has been party to five final judgments, India has been
party to two,' 2 8 and the following nations have each been party to one
judgment: Canada, 29 Nigeria,"' Pakistan,13' and Malaysia. 132
B. National Results
1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has been party to five final ICJ judgments on the
merits: Corfu Channel, 133 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v.
Norway), 134 Ambatielos, 135 Minquiers and Ecrehos, 136 and Fisheries
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland).' 37 As the discussion of each case
below suggests, in four of the five cases where the United Kingdom was a
party to an ICJ judgment, the rights of private parties were implicated in the
underlying dispute. Given that fact, it would seem reasonable to expect that
some of these private parties engaged in parallel litigation in domestic British
courts to either take advantage of an ICJ judgment or to avoid one (depending
2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Order of Jan. 19,
2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14939.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2009)
(holding that the United States failed to follow the 2008 provisional measures order in permitting the
execution of Medellin to go forward).
127. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Minquiers & Ecrehos (Fr. v.
U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Ambatielos (U.K. v. Greece), 1953 I.C.J. 10 (May 19); Fisheries
Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr.
9).
128. Appeal Relating to Jurisdiction of ICAO Council (Pak. v. India), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18);
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12).
129. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
130. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002
I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10).
131. Jurisdiction of ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18).
132. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan & Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625 (Dec.
17). Malaysia and Singapore, both common law nations, were also party to another ICJ judgment:
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.)
(Order of May 23, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14490.pdf (last visited
Mar. 26, 2009). However, the ICJ's judgment was issued within a year of this writing; it is unclear that a
domestic litigant would learn of the ICJ decision, find her legal interests adversely impacted, bring suit
in domestic court, and receive a judicial opinion dealing with the issue of domestic enforcement of an
ICJ judgment. Because of this timing issue, I believe it would be inappropriate to include that case in
this analysis. At this time, searches of Lexis-Nexis's combined Malaysian, Singaporean, and Bruneian
court reporters database reveal no reference to this case.
133. (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
134. (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 16 (Dec. 18).
135. (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 10 (May 19).
136. (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
137. (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
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on whether the judgment favored the party's legal claims or not). If private
parties did pursue such cases, then perhaps the British domestic courts would
have the opportunity to reach the question of enforceability of ICJjudgments.13
The United Kingdom sued Albania in the ICJ after two British naval
vessels were damaged (killing forty-four and injuring forty-two) in a
minefield in Albanian waters. This was the genesis of the well-known
Corfu Channel decision. The United Kingdom initially claimed damages in
the amount of £875,000,140 but later reduced its claim to £843,947. 141 The ICJ
found that it had jurisdiction over the dispute despite Albania's objection, 142
and ultimately ruled that Albania bore responsibility for the explosions that
damaged the British ships. 143 In a later ruling, the ICJ ruled that Albania owed
the British government £843,947.144 Albania refused to pay the amount, and
for many years refused to comply with the judgment entirely. 145 The British
government attempted to find Albanian assets located within the jurisdiction
of the United Kingdom to seize to satisfy the judgment. 146 It was unable to do
so, and its subsequent attempts to enforce the judgment led to another ICJ
case. 147 The issue was not resolved until the two nations reached a settlement
in 1992, with Albania finally agreeing to pay the United Kingdom
$2,000,000. 148
Because the Corfu Channel case involved death and injury to eighty-six
British sailors, for which Albania was eventually found to be responsible, it
would have seemed plausible that there was parallel litigation in British courts
by the injured parties against Albania. The survivors and the injured would
seem to have tort claims against Albania. However, the United Kingdom
considered itself liable to the survivors and the injured for medical costs,
138. The Lexis-Nexis Combined U.K. Database, which includes most of the relevant British
case reporters, does not contain any case that is a domestic parallel to any of the ICJ cases to which the
United Kingdom was a party (it does contain cases that cite to these ICJ cases for their general
precedential value, but that is legally different from using the ICJ decision as binding judgment or as
having res judicata effects). Halsbury's Laws of England contains entries for each of the above-
discussed cases, but does not provide any suggestion that a domestic court reached the issue.
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (5th ed. 2008).
139. Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 19,
20-21 (Sept. 30, 1947).
140. Id. at 52.
141. Observations Submitted Under the Order of the Court of the United Kingdom, Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 394 (July 28, 1949).
142. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. 15 (Mar. 25) (Judgment on Preliminary
Objections).
143. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (Apr. 9). The ICJ also ruled that a
subsequent British mine-sweeping operation was a violation of international law but that the judgment
itself provided satisfaction for Albania's claim. Id.
144. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244, 250 (Dec. 15) (Judgment on
Compensation).
145. SCHULTE, supra note 23, at 95-98.
146. Schachter, supra note 87, at 8 (citing the statement of the British Foreign Secretary).
147. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15)
(Judgment on Preliminary Objections).
148. SCHULTE, supra note 23, at 98. The increased figure from the initial judgment is
unsurprising given the forty-three year gap between the judgment in the United Kingdom's favor and the
final settlement and the difference in the value of the two currencies.
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pensions, etc. 149 Additionally, there was a very practical reason why a
survivor might not bring suit against Albania-Albania did not have any
assets in the United Kingdom. 150 Perhaps due to the statutory arrangement that
made the U.K. government liable for the injuries that the British sailors
suffered, or due to the fact that there were no Albanian assets within the reach
of British courts, the injured sailors and the survivors of the deceased sailors
did not pursue claims against Albania, and, as a result, the British courts did
not face the question of whether the ICJ judgment in the Corfu Channel case
was binding on them.
The Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Norway) case before the
ICJ raised an inverse question-might a British court ignore an ICJ judgment
that was to .the detriment of a British citizen? In 1951, the United Kingdom
sued Norway regarding the method by which Norway drew the baselines that
it used in delimiting its exclusive fishing zone off of its coast.15 1 This dispute
had simmered for years, but Norway began enforcing its claims more
vigorously in 1948, and British fishing ships were arrested by Norwegian
officials for violating what Norway considered its fishing zone.'53 As part of
its claims before the ICJ, the United Kingdom claimed compensation for these
arrests. 154 However, the ICJ decided against the United Kingdom; it held the
method Norway used in determining the fishing zone, and the baselines that
Norway drew, were not contrary to international law. 155 The U.K. Foreign
Office accepted the opinion and acknowledged its precedential value for
future international negotiations.
156
The owners of the fishing ships that were arrested by Norway suffered
losses in the form of opportunity costs, as well as litigation and other fees. The
lack of subsequent domestic litigation in the Norwegian case presents a
particularly interesting question. The British ship owners who suffered from
Norway's arrest of their ships must have been disappointed by the ICJ
holding, which found for Norway and precluded any order of compensation
directed at Norway.' 57 Why did the fishing vessel owners not seek to sue in
British domestic courts? Possibly because the Norwegian courts had already
adjudicated the cases of the fishing vessels. 158 Of course, res judicata only
applies to a court of competent jurisdiction; if Norway had violated
149. Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), supra note 139, at 25,
Annex 12-13.
150. Schachter, supra note 87, at 8. Plaintiffs may sue, even when they are aware that the
relevant defendant does not have assets available, to achieve a moral victory; however, this type of suit
represents something of a luxury (the plaintiff must pay legal expenses without hope of a financial return
on such an investment) and thus is probably less likely to occur than suits where a plaintiff has a chance
of receiving a pay-off.
151. Memorial of United Kingdom, Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings
17, 17 (Jan. 27, 1950).
152. Id. at 54.
153. Id. at 97.
154. Id. at 101.
155. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 143 (Dec. 18).
156. Fisheries Case Decision: Judgment Against Britain, TIMES (London), Dec. 19, 195 1, at 5.
157. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1951 I.C.J. at 143.
158. See, e.g., Rex v. Cooper, 20 I.L.R. 166 (Nor. App. Ct. 1953).
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international law by the manner in which it drew its baselines, then the
Norwegian courts would have been outside their jurisdiction in fining the
fishing vessels. However, the Foreign Office quickly accepted the ICJ
judgment, which had held that Norway did not violate international law.
159
Once the Foreign Office accepted the conclusion of the ICJ judgment, a
litigant trying to show that the Norwegian court lacked jurisdiction would
have had to convince a British court to disregard the British government's
definition of what constituted Norwegian territory. Potential litigants may
have seen that as an impossible task, and accepted the preclusive effects of the
Norwegian court judgments. Thus, the doctrines of res judicata, as much as
the existence of the ICJ judgment in favor of Norway, might have prevented
the British fishing vessel owners from instituting a claim in domestic courts.
The next case in which the United Kingdom was a party to a final
judgment of the ICJ was the Ambatielos case. Ambatielos was a Greek citizen
who sought to force the United Kingdom to submit to arbitration in a dispute
regarding a contract that Ambatielos buy several ships from the British
government. 160 The British government and Ambatielos were involved in
domestic litigation regarding the ships and Ambatielos was unsuccessful in his
appeals. 161 Ambatielos then sought the protection of the Greek government,
which claimed that by virtue of a 1926 commerce and navigation treaty
between the two nations, the dispute should be submitted to arbitration. 162 The
ICJ ultimately ruled for Greece and determined that the United Kingdom had
an obligation to consent to arbitration.' 63 The British Foreign Office accepted
the ruling and eventually the dispute was submitted to arbitration. 164
Ultimately, the arbitration panel decided against Ambatielos's claim.1
65
Apparently, the Ambatielos case did not lead to any subsequent domestic
litigation. Ambatielos and the British government had already been parties to
a domestic suit regarding the ships that formed the heart of the dispute that led
to the ICJ case. Ambatielos lost in British courts-at both the trial and
appellate court levels-before the Greek government brought the case to the
ICJ to compel arbitration. 166 Thus, within the British court system,
Ambatielos's claim was settled before the ICJ was seized of the case. Once
the ICJ did issue a ruling, the British Foreign Office responded promptly in
negotiating with Greece to reach an agreement to refer the case to
arbitration. 167 Additionally, even though the case involved the rights of a
private litigant, the very nature of the ICJ ruling-that the British government
ought to refer a dispute to arbitration-is not the type of command that is
easily enforced by a nation's domestic courts. Considering all of these factors,
159. See Fisheries Case Decision: Judgment Against Britain, supra note 156.
160. Counter-Memorial of United Kingdom, Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 1951 1.C.J.
Pleadings 129, 130-31 (Feb. 4, 1952).
161. Id. at 131.
162. Id.
163. Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 10, 23 (May 19).
164. Agreement Regarding Submission to Arbitration of Ambatielos Claim, Greece-U.K., Feb.
24, 1955, 209 U.N.T.S. 187.
165. Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 83 (Comm'n of Arb. 1956).
166. SCHULTE, supra note 23, at 113.
167. Agreement Regarding Submission to Arbitration of Ambatielos Claim, supra note 164.
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it should probably not be surprising that there was no litigation in British
courts following the issuance of the ICJ judgment.
A dispute in the ICJ over which nation-the United Kingdom or
France-owned two small, uninhabited island groups in the English Channel
demonstrated that border controversies might not implicate the legal interests
of private individuals. 68 The dispute ultimately involved a great deal of
historical evidence regarding whether the medieval kings of England
exercised control over the islands. 169 The ICJ eventually issued a declaratory
judgment that the islands were part of the territory of the United Kingdom.
On the facts of the case, there was no suggestion that private parties would
have legal interests that would spark parallel or subsequent domestic
litigation, and it is unsurprising that British courts have not addressed the
applicability of the Minquiers and Ecrehos judgment to domestic courts.
The Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) case was
reminiscent of Corfu Channel in that the ICJ sided with the United Kingdom
on a case that involved injury to private parties and yet, like Corfu Channel,
British courts evidently did not consider the effect of that ruling. In this case,
Iceland asserted a right to a broad exclusive fishing zone (fifty miles from the
Icelandic coast) that the United Kingdom and Germany claimed violated
international law. '71 Icelandic ships threatened to arrest British shipping
vessels, although none were actually arrested.1 72 Other British ships suffered
damage in the form of being ordered to haul up nets and leave the fifty-mile
area. 73 Icelandic ships attempted to cut the trawl wires of fishing ships and
even fired on other British vessels. 175 The United Kingdom claimed
compensation for the costs and losses suffered in these incidents.
76
The ICJ ultimately agreed with the British and German position, finding
that Iceland could not legally exclude the fishing ships of the two nations from
such a broad zone and that the parties were under an obligation to negotiate to
resolve the differences between them. 177 The ICJ did not reach a ruling
regarding the British claim for compensation. Iceland refused to comply,
however, and relations between Iceland and the United Kingdom continued to
deteriorate, to the point where the Security Council became briefly
involved. 178 Ultimately the ICJ ruling was rendered moot by the United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention, which recognized the right of coastal
nations to claim a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
179
168. Minquiers & Ecrehos (U.K. v. Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
169. See, e.g., id. at 55.
170. Id. at 72.
171. Memorial of United Kingdom, Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. Pleadings
267, 277-78 (July 31, 1973).
172. Id. at 375.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 375-76.
175. Id. at 377.
176. Id. at 378.
177. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 34 (July 25).
178. SCHULTE, supra note 23, at 151-54.
179. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
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Due to the damage that the Icelandic regime caused to both the United
Kingdom and individual fishing concerns, it would be plausible to assume that
private parties might have tried to pursue domestic litigation against Iceland.
The lack of litigation over the Iceland Fisheries Jurisdiction case is thus one
of the most difficult absences to explain. The judgment was in the United
Kingdom's favor, 80 there were no Icelandic court decisions,' 81 and private
interests were significantly affected by Iceland's actions.'
82
2. India
India has been party to two cases before the ICJ that have gone to final
judgment. The first was in the Right of Passage case brought by Portugal.
Portugal possessed three dependencies in India at the time the rest of India
became independent from the United Kingdom: Goa, Diu, and Daman.
Daman is composed of two territories: a littoral district of Daman itself and
inland enclaves Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. Nagar-Aveli was overrun by rebels
and India refused to allow Portugal to send either delegates of the governor of
Daman or troops to suppress the revolt. Portugal brought a case in the ICJ
against India, alleging that custom established a right of transit and
communication from Daman to Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. A 3 India argued that
such a custom did not exist, and, in the alternative, if it did exist, it was only
for commercial and governmental communication, not military passage.l184
The Court adopted something of a "split-the-baby" approach, ruling that
Portugal possessed a right of transit from Daman to Dadra and Nagar-Aveli
through Indian territory, but that such territory was subject to Indian
regulation. It also ruled that the right did not include a right to send military
forces or arms through Indian territory.
185
This case did not generate Indian case law on the issue of domestic
enforceability of ICJ judgments. 186 Given the facts of the case, this is
unsurprising. The ruling did not include a right to send troops through Indian
territory-the right Portugal probably most desired. Additionally, the ICJ had
specifically upheld the restrictions in governmental traffic between Daman
and the enclaves. This would seem to provide very few issues for Portugal to
litigate. Moreover, Portugal would have been faced with the practical problem
of seeking to enforce the ICJ judgment in the court system of a nation that was
deeply opposed to the continued Portuguese presence.
Dramatic changes on the ground further reduced whatever chance there
would have been for domestic litigation. The ICJ issued its opinion in 1960.
180. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974 I.C.J. at 34.
181. Memorial of United Kingdom, Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), supra note 171, at 376
(discussing ship damage without subsequent judicial condemnation).
182. Id. at 378.
183. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 9 (Apr. 12).
184. Counter-Memorial of India, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1958
I.C.J. Pleadings 146-49 (Mar. 25, 1958).
185. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. at 40-43.
186. Searches of Manupatra, a service of Indian court opinions equivalent to Lexis-Nexis or
Westlaw, reveals that the Right of Passage opinion has not been cited by any Supreme Court or High
Court opinion.
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By December 1961 not only Dadra and Nagar-Aveli, but Daman, Goa, and
Diu had been overrun by Indian troops and annexed to India. Given that the
ICJ opinion defined the right of passage as existing between Daman and
Dadra and Nagar-Aveli, 187 without a presence in Daman, Portugal would have
no way to claim a right of transit between Daman and the enclaves.
When Portugal did allege noncompliance with the judgment (somewhat
implausibly), it did so through a message to the Security Council, 188 not
domestic court litigation. The Right of Passage judgment suggests that some
of the cases that the ICJ hears do not involve private rights, only public rights.
This case also indicates how contextual some of the ICJ judgments are, such
that changes in the political situation can render a judgment essentially moot.
The second case before the ICJ in which India has faced a final
judgment of the court was the appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council. This case had its
genesis in the hijacking of an Indian plane, which was diverted to Pakistan
and destroyed.' 8 India suspended the rights of Pakistani planes to fly over
India in retaliation.' 90 Pakistan appealed to the ICAO Council to seek a ruling
against India's suspension. 19' India, in turn, objected to the jurisdiction of the
Council; when the Council ruled against its jurisdictional challenges, India
appealed to the ICJ.192 The ICJ decision was in favor of Pakistan: the ICAO
had properly rejected the Indian jurisdictional challenges. This judgment, in
effect, remanded the case because it did not make a decision on the merits of
the case-whether India could lawfully suspend Pakistani flights. From
India's perspective, the ICJ ruling did not entail any final resolution of the
dispute.
The ICAO Council case also failed to lead to domestic case law. 193
While private interests were indirectly at stake, the ruling itself was a narrow
one that related solely to the jurisdiction of an international organization. The
only plausible scenario involving domestic court action would have been a
private litigant seeking to force the government of India to participate in
ICAO proceedings if the government refused. Conversely, the only party that
could have objected to the judgment would have been the Indian government,
since the judgment did not determine any private rights. India complied with
the ruling in that it participated in the ICAO proceedings after the
judgment. 194
187. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. at 40-4 1.
188. Letter from Vasco Vieira Garin, Permanent Representative of Port., to the President of the
U.N. Sec. Council (Aug. 16, 1961), U.N. Doc S/4929 (Aug. 17, 1961).
189. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46, 51
(Aug. 18).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 50.
192. Id.
193. Manupatra shows that neither the Supreme Court nor the high courts of India have cited
the ICAO judgment.
194. Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Action of the Council, 88th Sess., at 22, ICAO Doc.
9171-C/1033 (June 30, 1976).
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The ICAO Council case parallels the Right of Passage case: it focused
on a narrow issue, relating to subjects that are peculiar to states, and was
eventually rendered irrelevant by later factual developments.'
95
3. Pakistan
The only case to which Pakistan has been a party that has resulted in a
final judgment by the ICJ is the previously discussed ICAO Council case.
From the Pakistani perspective, the case was unlikely to generate domestic
litigation: it was a case on a subject that only indirectly affected private rights,
it was on a narrow issue that focused solely on state interests, and it was a
Pakistani victory. It would be difficult to propose a plausible scenario in
which a private litigant in Pakistan would file suit to enforce the ICAO
Council judgment, or to challenge it. Therefore, it is unsurprising that ICAO
Council did not lead to domestic litigation. 196 This case again illustrates how
frequent it is for an ICJ case to have no relevance to private rights such that
domestic litigation would be possible.
4. Canada
Canada has been party to one ICJ case that resulted in a final judgment.
The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine focused on
the maritime boundary between Canada and the United States in the Gulf of
Maine. 197 The two parties brought the case to the ICJ by a special
agreement, 198 and a chamber of the court issued a precise ruling drawing the
boundary line.' 99 Both governments accepted the ruling. Canadian courts have
not had a reason to address the domestic enforcement of the decision. 20 0 Two
courts have referenced the judgment as part of the factual background of the
case before them. 201 This is unsurprising because the case dealt with a
boundary dispute, it was accepted by both parties, and both nations now
195. The ICAO proceedings were discontinued without a formal resolution. Id.
196. Thorough research of Pakistani case law digests from 1970 to 1980 has revealed no
evidence of a citation by Pakistani courts to the ICAO Council opinion; additionally, searches of
Pakistanlawsite, http://www.pakistanlawsite.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2009), a Pakistani electronic case
law database, did not reveal any case law dealing with the ICAO Council case.
197. Special Agreement Between Canada and the United States, Maritime Delimitation in the
Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings 7 (Mar. 29, 1979).
198. Id.
199. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 246, 345 (Oct. 12).
200. A search of Lexis-Nexis databases for Canadian cases shows no citation to the Gulf of
Maine case by Canadian courts that either challenged or sought to enforce the boundary line
delimitation.
201. See Comeau's Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [1992] 3 F.C.
54 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.) (noting the ICJ decision as background in a dispute between a Canadian fisherman
and the Canadian government regarding a claim that the government reneged on a promised license),
rev'd, [1995] 2 F.C. 467 (Can. Fed. Ct. App.), affid, [1997] S.C.R. 12 (Can.) (neither the appellate court
nor the Supreme Court of Canada referenced the lCJ judgment in resolving the instant case); Mersey
Seafoods Ltd. v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, [1985] 2 C.T.C. 2485, 2514 (Can. Tax Ct.) (noting that the
Canadian and American governments had reserved certain issues in the Special Agreement that referred
the boundary dispute to the ICJ and that this reservation explained any discrepancy between what the
Canadian government argued in the instant case and in the ICJ case).
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consider it a closed matter. Any party that did try to challenge the maritime
border would have to argue against the opinions of both governments as well
as the ICJ judgment.
5. Nigeria
Nigeria has also been party to one boundary dispute case before the ICJ.
This concerned its boundary with Cameroon, particularly in the Lake Chad
region and over the possession of the Bakassi Peninsula (which is adjacent to
the Gulf of Guinea).2 °2 The two also disagreed over the maritime boundary
claims in the Gulf of Guinea; Equatorial Guinea joined the case to press its
own claims in that regard.203 This was not a small border dispute-the
populations inhabiting the disputed areas numbered in the many thousands.
Moreover, there had been intermittent violence in the disputed areas that had
led to several deaths. The ICJ found jurisdiction over the case and issued an
opinion that favored Cameroon in most respects, including granting its claim
to the Bakassi peninsula. 20 4 The maritime boundary division tended to favor
Nigeria, but perhaps equally importantly, the ICJ rejected Cameroon's claims
for state responsibility for the violence that had occurred along the border.
20 5
Nigeria accepted part of the ruling and moved to implement some of
it;2 6 however, Nigeria was also firmly opposed to surrendering the Bakassi
peninsula. Many Nigerians bitterly refused to accept the proposed transfer,207
and some alleged that such an act would be unconstitutional. However, in
June 2006, Nigeria and Cameroon entered an agreement that involved ceding
the peninsula to Cameroon, and the Nigerian military was evacuated from the
area in August 2006.208
202. In a related matter, an organization that claimed Cameroon illegally controlled the part of
the country formerly ruled by the United Kingdom-the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization
(SCAPO)-brought suit in Nigeria to force the Nigerian government to bring SCAPO's claims before
the ICJ; according to SCAPO, in 2002 a federal high court in Abuja granted a mandatory injunction
obligating the Nigerian federal government to bring such claims to the ICJ. Southern Cameroon
Petitions UN, Seeks Independence, THIS DAY (Nig.), July 9, 2006, available at
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=52544. This is the only case of which the author is aware
where a nongovernmental entity tried to force a government to bring an ICJ case; in any event,
SCAPO's claims were not taken up by Nigeria.
203. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq.
Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10).
204. Id. at 455.
205. Id. at 458.
206. Stanley Nkwazema, 'Nigeria, Cameroun Yet To Resolve Bakassi Peninsula' Dispute, THIS
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The issue of the Bakassi peninsula has led to litigation, if not case law.
Several suits have challenged the actions the Nigerian government has taken
to implement the judgment, although the focus of the challenges is the
agreement implementing the judgment as opposed to the judgment itself.209 A
trial-level court in the Nigerian capital Abuja issued a temporary restraining
order against the Nigerian government shortly before the government was to
engage in the final handover of control to Cameroon. 2 10 The restraining order
provoked a fierce response from some government officials, who claimed that
the order was an attempt by the local court to function as an appellate court to
the ICJ. 2  However, the plaintiffs in the case claimed to be attacking the
method in which the ICJ judgment had been implemented-the agreement
between Nigeria and Cameroon-rather than the judgment itself. 212 The
opposition to the ICJ judgment has appeared in two ways in addition to court
suits. The first has been the appearance of rebel groups, and threats to declare
the independence of the peninsula, after the Nigerian troops withdrew.213 The
second avenue of opposition has been legislative refusal to ratify the
agreement Nigeria reached with Cameroon. The National Assembly has called
the President's actions in signing the agreement and withdrawing from the
peninsula unconstitutional without formal legislative approval214 and withheld
such approval until just before the final transfer of territory to Cameroon.215
The government, however, has appeared untroubled by the domestic court
injunction, the threats of violence, and the legislative opposition. Nigeria
completed the territorial transfer process in spite of the restraining order. It
is unclear whether the litigation that led to the restraining order will continue
now that the transfer is complete. 21 7 Defenders of the government's conduct
have argued that it is both a fait accompli-the military withdrawal from the
peninsula is complete, and the peninsula is now part of Cameroon-and that
the ICJ judgment and the agreement implementing it are superior to the
Nigerian constitution. For much of the dispute, the involvement of the
Nigerian courts was secondary to the other avenues of resistance; it appears
over Bakassi, THIS DAY (Nig.), June 14, 2006, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id
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209. See, e.g., Ernest Chinwo, Indigenes Urge Court To Stop Election in Bakassi, THIS DAY
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that none of these avenues were effective in opposing the ICJ judgment and
the implementing agreement.
6. Malaysia
Malaysia has been party to one ICJ final judgment that is included in this
study: 2 8 a dispute between it and Indonesia regarding two islands northeast of
Borneo, Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan. 2 19 Only the larger island, Sipadan,
was inhabited at the time of the case. The ICJ ruled in favor of Malaysia,
recognizing its sovereignty over the islands. Indonesia agreed to abide by
the ruling. It does not appear that Malaysian courts have referenced the
judgment in their own jurisprudence. 221 This is another example of an ICJ
judgment that dealt with a dispute whose subject matter is not applicable to
domestic litigation: it was essentially a border dispute, both parties accepted
the outcome, and very few people were even indirectly affected by the case.
The only imaginable suit that this case could have generated would have been
some attempt to force Malaysia not to accept sovereignty over the islands, a
farfetched scenario that clearly did not come to pass.
However, another case, while technically outside the scope of this
survey, is worth noting. In 1996, a Malaysian attorney, who was appointed to
be a U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
made comments in a magazine interview that were interpreted as defamatory
toward a Malaysian company. 222 When the Malaysian company sued the
Rapporteur in Malaysian courts, he asserted a defense of immunity. The
Malaysian government and the United Nations agreed to refer the question of
immunity to the ICJ through its advisory jurisdiction provision, as called for
in section 30 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. 223 The ICJ ruled that the rapporteur was entitled to
immunity. 224A Malaysian high court ruled that the ICJ opinion was
conclusive as to the issue of immunity, because the Malaysian government
had specifically consented to refer the case for the advisory opinion. 225 The
court, however, could not resist criticizing both the ICJ and the rapporteur in
226dicta. This case falls outside of the scope of this survey because it came to
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the ICJ through its advisory jurisdiction, rather than its contentious case
jurisdiction. However, it indicates that Malaysian courts could be willing to
defer to ICJ judgments if such a situation arose.
V. ANALYSIS
The most relevant points from the survey of the common law nations
that have been party to ICJ decisions are: there is no evidence of a doctrine of
direct enforcement of ICJ decisions in domestic courts; on the other hand,
there is no evidence that such a proposal was considered and rejected by
domestic courts; most of the cases on the ICJ docket do not implicate private
interests; and, even those cases that do implicate private interests only very
rarely lead to domestic litigation.
It seems clear that other common law nations have not developed a
doctrine of direct incorporation of ICJ judgments. Does this fact support the
Supreme Court's argument in Medellin that its decision is in line with the
other signatories of the U.N. Charter? Not exactly; instead, what is revealed is
that few courts have considered this question-there is almost no doctrine in
either direction. Domestic court litigants very rarely seek to enforce ICJ
judgments. Two dichotomies may help answer this question: public concerns
versus private concerns at the international level, and private individuals as
plaintiffs versus private individuals as defendants.
The docket of the ICJ probably accounts for a large part of the
explanation for the lack of cases: the majority of the cases in which common
law nations have been parties were border or maritime delimitations.227 Other
than the fishing jurisdiction cases to which the United Kingdom was a party,
and the Nigerian border dispute, most of the border and maritime delimitation
cases do not appear to involve actions that damaged private interests.
Moreover, most of the boundary delimitation cases have been accepted by the
nations involved. This places a litigant trying to challenge the judgment in a
double bind: not only would such a litigant have to argue against the ICJ
judgment, but also against the boundaries that both of the relevant nations
claim to respect. The cases to which India was a party (one of which also
228involved Pakistan), while not boundary disputes, were also unlikely to
produce domestic litigation. Both cases involved issues that were not directly
relevant to private interests, and both were quickly rendered irrelevant by
further factual developments.
The British fisheries cases, which did involve allegations of injuries to
private persons, 229 and the Corfu Channel case, which involved close to one
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1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Minquiers &
Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116
(Dec. 18).
228. Jurisdiction of ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18); Right of Passage
over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12).
229. Memorial of United Kingdom, Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), supra note 171, at
277-78; Memorial of United Kingdom, Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Nor.), supra note 151, at 17.
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hundred casualties, 230 appeared on their facts to have been likely candidates
for domestic litigation. Does the absence of British domestic court cases in
which either of these ICJ judgments were given direct effect suggest that the
United Kingdom does not consider ICJ judgments automatically binding on
domestic courts? It is still impossible to say; even in cases such as these,
which involved private interests, the issue appears not to have been litigated in
British courts, or such litigation never generated a written opinion. Perhaps
doctrines such as the mutuality requirement of res judicata and foreign
sovereign immunity may have conspired to render neither a suit to enforce ICJ
judgments nor a challenge to ICJ judgments a likely outcome.
At least some Nigerian litigants did attempt to challenge a governmental
action justified by an ICJ decision.231 Even though a court issued a restraining
order, the government was able to continue with its plans. 232 The issue never
reached the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The lesson to be drawn from this case
is obscure; the litigants challenged the implementing agreement as much as
the ICJ decision. Additionally, the government ignored the court order without
any apparent repercussions. Perhaps the simplest lesson is that courts are not
always effective even if they do become involved in a dispute.
Despite the slant in the ICJ's case law toward public concerns, there is
no guarantee that future cases will not involve private rights. Justice Breyer's
dissent in Medellin included an appendix of treaties to which the United States
was a party that gave jurisdiction over disputes to the ICJ.233 Many of these
treaties are economic cooperation or friendship, commerce, and navigation
agreements that include property, contract, and freedom of commerce as
subject matters.234 Other conventions where the United States has acceded to
ICJ jurisdiction deal with copyright and patent issues. 235 Despite its public law
focus, the United States has agreed that the ICJ can be called upon to consider
what would be essentially private rights claims.
The distinction between a plaintiff and a defendant in a domestic court
may be important as well. Doctrines such as res judicata and sovereign
immunity may substantially reduce the possibility that a private plaintiff
would be able to sue a government to enforce an adverse ICJ judgment in that
nation's own courts; the pragmatic concern that the debtor nation might not
have any assets in the reach of a court in the creditor state or a third-party state
would be an additional disincentive to bringing a suit. However, the problems
of sovereign immunity and lack of available assets would be less burdensome
where a private individual is a defendant against the government and raises an
ICJ judgment as a defense to the government's action.
A subset of the plaintiff-defendant distinction may be the particular
concerns of a criminal defendant. It should be noted that none of the cases in
230. Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), supra note 139, at 25.
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this study involved alleged treaty violations in the area of criminal law. The
VCCR series of cases appears to be unique in that respect. The involvement of
criminal law probably simultaneously raises the likelihood that domestic
courts must wrestle with any ICJ decisions on the subject-a criminal
defendant would not be barred by doctrines such as sovereign immunity the
way a civil plaintiff might be-while at the same time possibly increasing the
resistance on the part of domestic courts to accept international supervision.
The difference in expertise between an international court, which rarely is
called upon to consider issues of criminal procedure, and domestic courts,
which deal with criminal issues regularly, is particularly stark. The Avena
judgment and the Arrest Warrant judgment are two of only a few ICJ
judgments that dealt with a criminal case. Currently pending in the ICJ is a
case between the Republic of the Congo and France involving French
assertions of criminal jurisdiction over Congolese leaders; it should be
interestingto see how French prosecutors and courts react to any judgment in
that case.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note started with the Supreme Court's opinion in Medellin. That
decision held that the ICJ's decision in the Avena case had no binding effect
on American courts. The Court justified its decision in part through reference
to the postratification understanding of fellow signatories of the U.N. Charter.
To put that assertion to the test, I focused on the common law nations that
have been party to ICJ final judgments. I examined each case to determine
which cases could plausibly provoke domestic litigation wherein the question
of the interaction between domestic courts and the ICJ could be answered. I
found that few ICJ cases presented facts that could implicate private interests.
I also found that even those few cases that did implicate private interests still
did not result in domestic case law that addressed the relevant question. The
postratification understanding of other nations, at least other common law
nations, has been a silence: the question answered in Medellin has not been
asked in most other national courts.
My research was limited only to common law nations that have been
party to an ICJ final judgment. Although the limitation to common law
nations was logically justified, given the unique view of judges and courts that
distinguishes the common law tradition, and due to the prevalence of dualism
among common law nations, many U.N. Charter signatories belong to other
legal traditions. As a result, my study is not a conclusive answer to the
postratification practice of U.N. Charter signatories. It is merely the starting
point. Future scholarship should account for the practice of civil law nations
that have been party to ICJ judgments. Any discrepancy between that future
scholarship and my own findings would be interesting not only for what it
might say about domestic enforcement of ICJ judgments, but also for what it
might say about the differing ways civil and common law nations view
236. Application of Congo, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J.
129 (Apr. 11).
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international judgments. However, if common law nations, for the reasons I
have discussed above, are the nations most likely to reject automatic
enforcement of an ICJ judgment as domestic law, and yet have not developed
a postratification understanding that does indeed manifest such a rejection,
then it seems plausible that a broader survey-one that include civil law
nations-would not demonstrate a postratification understanding that supports
the position of Medellin.
I have argued that foreign nations do not show a shared understanding of
how ICJ judgments enter domestic law. While the Medellin court may or may
not have reached the correct outcome, my findings suggest that the Court's
arguments about domestic law are the sole support for its opinion. But
disputing this one reference to the postratification understanding of other
nations is still a valuable exercise. Other nations, or indeed American litigants
in future cases that raise issues relating to ICJ decisions, might look back to
Medellin and take the majority's statement regarding postratification
understanding as a suggestion that other nations have reached positions
similar to the Court's conclusion. This Note shows that, in fact, the Medellin
Court was one of the first courts to address this question; it stands not as a
summary of the postratification practice of many nations but as the statement
of how one nation addressed this question. The courts of other nations, if they
are faced with similar questions of domestic enforcement of ICJ opinions,
may feel greater liberty to come to contrary conclusions if they understand
that Medellin essentially wrote on a blank slate.
The litigants in Medellin were unfortunate enough to face a question that
the courts of few other nations have asked themselves. Yet past practice is no
guarantee of the future: the ICJ's docket has grown in the last decade, and
many treaties that give jurisdiction to the ICJ involve subject matters that
affect individual rights. It is possible that in the future, other nations will
wrestle with the question of whether ICJ decisions should be enforced through
domestic court decisions. If that is the case, the United States might be forced
to revisit the decision in Medellin to maintain the uniformity of understanding
of which Justice Scalia spoke:
When federal courts interpret a treaty to which the United States is a party, they should
give considerable respect to the interpretation of the same treaty by the courts of other
signatories. Otherwise the whole object of the treaty, which is to establish a single,
agreed-upon regime governing the actions of all the signatories, will be frustrated.
238
As the U.N. Charter celebrates its sixty-fourth birthday, with every indication
of permanence and success, it is important to recognize that Justice Scalia's
call for an analysis of postratification uniformity of practice is in essence a
call for continual comparative analysis. More nations that are party to the
Charter will be forced to answer these questions, and their answers may not be
in agreement with the U.S. Supreme Court's. Medellin might be described as
237. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1393-96 app. B (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (Apr. 2,
2004), in 98 AM. Soc'y IN''L L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004).
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the last word on the question of direct enforcement of ICJ decisions by
American courts, but perhaps the better description is that it is merely the
latest word, subject to revision as other nations weigh in.

